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Foreword 
Financing is likely to displace resource availability and environmental con-
cerns as the dominant energy issue in the coming decades. Especially in 
developing countries , energy-sector financing will become more difficult as 
private-sector involvement increases and competition with other investments 
intensifies. In general, energy-sector investments yield lower returns than 
many investment alternatives, whereas public-sector financing capabilities 
are seriously hampered by already high levels of indebtedness. 
This paper assesses these and other important issues concerning the 
financing of long-term global and regional energy perspectives. It applies 
the findings of the study jointly conducted by IIASA and the World Energy 
Council (WEC) presented in the report Global Energy Perspectives to 2050 
and Beyond. The IIASA- WEC study formulates alternative scenarios with 
an integrated assessment framework of energy and environmental models. 
Three cases of economic and energy developments were formulated; the cases 
span six scenarios of energy supply alternatives extending until the end of the 
21st century. The assessment of finance requirements for these six scenarios 
constitutes one of the key elements of the IIASA- WEC study. 
Financing requirements of energy prospects underlying the scenarios are 
enormous. Cumulative capital needs between 1990 and 2020 range from 
US$13 to US$20 trillion (at 1990 prices). For comparison, the latter figure 
corresponds to the total world economic output in the year 1990. Supplying 
this amount may pose unprecedented financing problems, as the share of 
energy-sector investments in total world output is unlikely to increase from 
the current level of 3 to 4%. In addition, there will be a fundamental shift 
in investment activity from the energy sector to end-use infrastructures and 
end-use technologies, which are not accounted for in energy-sector invest-
ments but also require :financing. These and other interesting findings of the 
joint IIASA- WEC study are summarized in this paper. The paper is only a 
beginning. Financing energy-sector development will continue to constitute 
an important part of IIASA research activities in the energy area. 
lll 
Peter E. de J anosi 
· Director 
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AS INCOMES INCREASE around the world, people will demand more efficient, 
cleaner and less obtrusive energy services. This is the central message of the three 
cases, sub-divided into six scenarios, that are presented in the comprehensive re-
port of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and World Energy 
Council joint study, Global Energy Perspectives to 2050 and Beyond. I The scenar-
ios cover a wide range of global energy developments - from a massive expan-
sion of coal production to strict limits, from a phase-out of nuclear energy to a 
substantial increase, from carbon emissions in 2100, that are at only one-third of 
today's levels, to increases of more than a factor of three. Yet, for all the variations 
they explore among alternative energy systems, all manage to match the likely, 
continuing push by consumers for more flexible, more convenient and cleaner 
forms of energy. This paper summarises the financing requirements of the energy 
sector, in order to achieve these goals, with a particular emphasis on investment in 
the developing regions. 
Capital requirements are assessed according to the traditional definitions of 
energy investment. They include capital for energy production capacities, for con-
version and transformation facilities, for transmission and distribution infrastruc-
tures, and for complying with environmental standards. Capital requirements for 
energy end-use devices are not included in this assessment (traditionally they are 
Nebojsa Nakicenovic is from the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Lax-
enburg, Austria; he is Leader of the Environmentally Compatible Energy Strategies Project 
at //ASA and Director of the Long-Term Energy Perspectives Study of the World Energy 
Council. Hans-Holger Rogner is from //ASA and the University of Victoria ,' Canada; he is 
Director of the Systems Analysis Institute for Integrated Energy Systems and Adjunct Pro-
fessor at the Department of Mechanical Engineering at the University of Victoria. 
March 1996 
excluded from energy-sector capital requirements and are counted as durable con-
sumer goods and business investment). The cumulative capital requirements from 
1990 to 2020, across the cases, ranges from (US 1990) $13 trillion to 20 tr. This is 
to be compared with the gross world economic product (GWP) of $21 tr in 1990. 
Although both this range and magnitude of capital requirements are enormous, 
they are less intimidating when viewed in the context of economic growth, invest-
ment, savings, GWP and the size of capital markets implied by the scenarios. Capi-
tal requirements grow substantially, but more slowly, than GWP. This is true in all 
scenarios, but it does not imply that these capital requirements can actually be 
raised on domestic and international capital markets for energy investment. 
The three cases, sub-divided into six scenarios, build on the analysis of the 
WEC Commission Report, Energy for Tomorrow's World.2 The development paths 
of the six scenarios vary through 2020, but, after 2020, they start to diverge. Part of 
that divergence will depend on policy choices and development strategies. For ex-
ample, two scenarios, that assume aggressive international cooperation focused on 
environmental protection and international equity, lead to less fossil fuel use than 
the other scenarios. Most of the post-2020 divergence will depend on technological 
developments and economic restructuring. Which energy sources in 2020 will be 
better matched to the more flexible, more convenient and cleaner forms of energy 
desired by the consumer? Which will have made the investment in research and 
development that will give them a technological edge? Which will have shifted 
their businesses away from providing just tons of coal or kilowatt-hours of elec-
tricity towards also providing more flexible, convenient and clean energy services 
to consumers? 
The answers to these questions will be determined between now and 2020. 
Because of the long lifetimes of power plants, refineries and other forms of energy 
investment, there is insufficient turnover of such facilities to reveal large diver-
gences across our scenarios prior to 2020, but the seeds of the post-2020 world will 
have been sown by then. The choice of the world's post-2020 energy systems is 
wide open now. It will be much narrower by 2020. Today's energy investment, 
especially in the developing world, will shape future opportunities and financing 
possibilities. 
1. Main characteristics of scenarios 
As in Energy for Tomorrow's World, the joint IIASA/WEC study report, 
Global Energy Perspectives to 2050 and Beyond, presents three sets of scenarios 
- Cases A, B, and C. It examines the possibilities beyond 2020 more thoroughly 
than could be done in Energy for Tomorrow's World. The principal focus is on the 
period between 2020 and 2050, but some preliminary results are also presented up 
to 2100. In brief, Case A presents a future of impressive technological improve-
ments and high economic growth. Case B describes a future with less ambitious, 
though perhaps more realistic, technological improvements and, consequently, 
more intermediate economic growth. Case C presents a "rich ecofogically driven" 
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Table 1 
A summary for three cases in 2050 and 2100 
Case A CaseB CaseC 
High Growth Middle Course Ecologically 
Driven 
Population (bn) 
2050 10. l 10.1 10. l 
2100 11.7 11.7 11.7 
GWP ($(1990) tr) 
2050 100 75 75 
2100 300 200 220 
Energy intensity improvement medium low high 
PE/GDP (%/yr) 
World (1999-2050) -1.0 ---0.7 -1.4 
World (1990-2100) -1.0 ---0.8 -1.5 
Primary energy demand (Gtoe) 
2050 25 20 14 
2100 45 35 21 
Resource availability 
Fossil high medium low 
Non-fossil high medium high 
Technology costs 
Fossil low medium high 
Non-fossil low medium low 
Technology dynamics 
Fossil high medium medium 
Non-fossil high medium high 
C02 emissions constraint no no yes 
Carbon emissions (GtC) 
2050 9-15 10 5 
2100 7-22 14 2 
Environmental taxes no no yes 
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Figure 1 
Global primary energy use, 1850 to present, and in the three cases to 2100 
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The insert shows global population growth, 1850 to present, and its projection3 to 2100, in 
billions of people. 
future. It includes both substantial technological progress and unprecedented inter-
national cooperation, centred explicitly on environmental protection. 
The key characteristics of the three cases are summarised in table 1 and 
short descriptions are given in the Appendix. The following paragraphs provide 
more detail on what they have in common and where they differ. 
1.1 Commonalities among scenarios 
All three cases provide for significant social and economic development, 
particularly in the developing countries, and are therefore based on a substantial in-
crease in financing requirements. They lead to improved energy efficiencies and 
environmental compatibility and, thus, for associated growth in both the quantity 
and quality of energy services. 
World population is expected to double to 10 bn by the year 2050 and to in-
crease to nearly 12 bn by the year 2100 (figure 1), while economic development 
continues throughout the world. According to the scenarios in this study, the result 
is a three-to-five-fold increase in world economic output by the year 2050 and a 
ten-to-15-fold increase by the year 2100. By the year 2100, per capita income in 
most of the currently developing countries reaches, and surpasses, levels character-
istic of the developed countries today, making current distinctions between the two 
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Table 2 
Characteristics of three cases, sub-divided into six scenarios 
for the world in 2050 
Case A CaseB CaseC 
---
Al A2 A3 B Cl C2 
Final energy (Gtoe) 17 17 17 14 IO IO 
Final energy mix(%) 
Solids 16 19 18 23 19 20 
Liquids 42 36 33 33 34 34 
Electricity 17 18 18 16 18 17 
Other" 25 27 31 28 29 29 
Primary energy (Gtoe) 25 25 25 20 14 14 
Primary energy mix(%) 
Coal 24 32 9 21 11 IO 
Oil 30 19 18 20 19 18 
Gas 24 22 32 23 27 24 
Nuclear 6 4 11 14 4 12 
Renewables 16 23 30 22 39 36 
Resource use 1990-2050 (Gtoe) 
Coal 235 324 180 226 143 141 
Oil 323 302 284 257 210 210 
Gas 241 247 285 227 210 197 
Energy sector investment($ tr) 1.2 1.7 1.2 1.1 0.7 0.7 
$/toe supplied 50 67 47 56 50 50 
as% ofGWP 1.2 1.7 1.2 1.5 0.9 0.9 
Emissions 
Sulphur"·c MtS 23 86 15 35 4 3 
Nitrogenc MtN 21 55 21 22 14 12 
Carbon,GtC 12 15 9 IO 5 5 
a. District heat, gas and hydrogen. 
b. Unabated sulphur emissions in Case A could be three (Al) to five (A2) times higher, leading to un-
acceptable local and regional environmental impacts. 
c. Preliminary global estimates. 
obsolete. Primary energy consumption grows less than global demand for energy 
services, due to improvements in energy intensities. Figure l shows a one-and-a-
half-to-three-fold increase in primary energy requirements, across the three cases, 
by the year 2050, and a two-to-five-fold increase by the year 2100. 
1.2 Distinctions among scenarios 
Where all six scenarios diverge is in the dynamics of energy system transfor-
mation, as reflected in the contributions of individual primary energy sources - in 
other words, what percentage is supplied by coal, what percentage by oil, and so 
on. That divergence is shown in table 2, which summarises key numerical charac-
teristics for all six scenarios. It presents a snapshot of how the scenarios would 
look in 2050. 
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Figure 2 
Evolution of primary energy shares, 1850-2100, for Case B 
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Figure 2 presents the development, over time, of the structure of primary en-
ergy shares in Case B. Other cases, and their underlying scenarios, portray differ-
ent dynamics of future changes in energy sources and in the structure of the energy 
system. However, the overall characteristic is a continuous shift from fossil to 
other sources of energy and towards higher quality and more flexible, cleaner 
forms of energy delivered to the final consumer. 
Assumptions on the salient forces driving and shaping future energy systems 
are varied across the scenarios, in order to explore both differences and commonal-
ities of alternative future primary and final energy structures. The scenarios vary: 
with respect to future technologies, in terms of penetration rates, performance and 
cost; with respect to the availability of energy sources, a question also closely re-
lated to technology; and with respect to geopolitical and policy issues, such as 
trade, technology transfer, environmental regulation and energy deregulation. 
The high-growth Case A consists of three scenarios (Al, A2, A3); Case B, a 
single scenario; and the ecologically-driven Case C, two scenarios (Cl and C2). 
This reflects the possibility of alternative development strategies, with comparable 
levels of affluence and energy use. The three-pronged unfolding of Case A indi-
cates that high levels of energy demand could be supplied by three fundamentally 
different strategies, which diverge from each other over time. In Case C, the differ-
ences between the two alternatives considered are less dramatic. For the intermedi-
ate Case B, a single scenario was developed. In general, this scenario is associated 
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with more modest, perhaps also more realistic, changes; therefore, it did not seem 
useful to consider more extreme alternatives for the development of the energy 
system. Energy sector investment requirements are given with the greatest degree 
of detail for Case B, because it is less extreme than the other alternatives and be-
cause it illustrates the "middle course" of future financing requirements. 
1.3 Implications for financing requirements 
Having presented the cases, and how they unfold into six energy system 
scenarios, we now tum to their implications for investment and financing. All three 
cases reflect substantial growth for all energy industries to at least the year 2020, 
and profound changes beyond, leading to an enormous range and magnitude of 
capital requirements. The coming decades will bring numerous changes within and 
between energy sectors. Many new business opportunities will arise, linked to 
cleaner and more convenient fuels, to liquid rather than solid fuels , to grid and 
other interconnected supplies, and to more locally appropriate - often small-scale 
- energy sources and conversion technologies. However, the cases indicate that 
prospects will diverge after the year 2020, with energy industries and consumer 
needs embarking on mutually exclusive development paths across the six scenar-
ios. All these developments would have profound implications for future financing 
requirements. This is reflected in the range of cumulative capital requirements to 
the year 2020 - $13-20 tr across the six scenarios. 
Despite its huge resource base, coal could be particularly vulnerable, due to 
increased competition from other energy sources and environmental constraints in 
response to sulphur dioxide, particulate, methane and carbon dioxide emissions. In 
contrast, the oil industry and, to an even greater extent, the natural gas industry 
have a long future ahead. The prospects for natural gas, however, will have to be 
enhanced by aggressive exploration and resource development. New markets will 
need to be developed for the traditional fuels, with the recognition that the shift 
from just selling primary or final energy to marketing energy services will continue 
and intensify. 
In all scenarios, renewable energy sources undergo significant expansion. 
Despite a slower start than depicted in other studies, the outlook given here is 
clearly bullish in the long run, a view also taken in the WEC's New Renewable 
Energy Resources: a Guide to the Future.4 The development and diffusion of new 
renewables are seen as requiring several OECD countries to take leading roles, 
with subsequent large technology transfers to developing countries. In the long run, 
the biggest market for renewables will be in the South. 
For nuclear power, prospects beyond the year 2020 are more uncertain. The 
potential for nuclear energy to make a substantial contribution will depend on 
whether public concern about operational safety, waste disposal and proliferation 
can be alleviated. If such concern persists, nuclear power could wither away; how-
ever, it may be successfully challenged to introduce a new generation of ,facilities 
that are more acceptable. 
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Technological progress and appropriate investment, to match energy sources 
to the desire for the more flexible, convenient and clean forms of energy required 
to service consumer needs, are crucial, but several decades of turnover of capital 
stock will be required to achieve that match. In the meantime, unless the long-term 
goal is itself matched by the appropriate policies and investment decisions, it will 
become even harder and more costly to change courts. Investment decisions to the 
year 2020 are, therefore, an important concern - not simply because of the 
tremendous sums of money involved. Work also needs to be done to extend the 
analysis beyond final energy, to cover energy services and find out what new insti-
tutional mechanisms are required to facilitate energy-financing and the implemen-
tation of environmental policies attracting ever-widening support. 
We believe this study has identified patterns that are robust across a purposely 
broad range of scenarios. They can never tum an uncertain future into a sure one, 
but they can delimit future energy-financing requirements consistent with the range 
of scenarios. 
2. Investment and financing 
2.1 Energy capital markets and investment 
Although the capital requirements for all three cases are enormous, they are 
less intimidating when looked at in the context of economic growth, investment, 
savings and the size of capital markets implied by the scenarios. The current aver-
age global investment rate is about 22 per cent of GWP - 21 per cent in the indus-
trialised countries and 24 per cent in the developing countries. In the reforming 
economies, recent gross domestic product (GDP) declines have been matched by 
reduced savings, keeping the investment rate relatively constant at about 20 per 
cent. 5 Although the level of energy investment, as a share of economic product and 
total investment, varies greatly among countries and between different stages of 
economic development, on average, between three and four per cent of GDP is in-
vested in the energy sector, and this ratio is expected to remain relatively stable.6 
Average ratios of energy to total investment are also quite stable, at about 20 per 
cent - approximately ten per cent for power sector investment and 5-10 per cent 
for upstream operations in the coal, oil and gas sectors. Deviations from these av-
erages could be as high as a factor of two to three over the next decades. Large en-
ergy exporters or rapidly developing countries, for example, experience higher 
rates. 
Capital markets have been growing faster than total GDP for some time. Pres-
ent annual global energy investment amounts to at least ten per cent of international 
credit financing, which is about $3.6 tr.7 With capital markets growing relative to 
GDP, and assuming relatively stable future energy investment ratios, capital market 
size appears not to be a limiting factor for energy sector finance. 
The real challenges in raising funds for energy investment are the perceived 
risks to investors and adequate rates of return. Returns in the energy sector do not 
always compare well with many private investment alternatives, not even with 
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other infrastructure investment. Between 197 4 and 1992, for example, electricity 
projects, supported by the World Bank, realised average rates of return of 11 per 
cent per year, while urban development and transport returns were 23 and 21 per 
cent, respectively.8 Also important is the allocation of funds within the energy sec-
tor. Rate of return considerations discriminate against smaller-scale, clean and in-
novative energy supplies, and against investment in energy efficiency improvements. 
Market size and product mobility often favour investment in oil exploration over, 
for example, natural gas or energy conservation. 
Until now, in many countries, much of the energy sector has been publicly 
owned, and, in most developing countries, substantial international funding has 
supplemented limited domestic capabilities. The share of private sector capital has 
usually been less than 20 per cent. More recently, growing public and private debt, 
in industrialised and developing countries alike, has made energy sector financing, 
with its long amortisation periods, more difficult. Privatisation has become the ac-
cepted political remedy. A second development, increasing the likely dependence 
of energy investment on private capital, is stagnation in international development 
finance, despite an increase in international credit financing from five per cent of 
gross world product, or about $175 bn, in 1973, to 17 per cent, or about $3.6 tr, in 
1993.7 Although energy financing, therefore, must come increasingly from the pri-
vate sector, government policies can make a difference: by restructuring subsidies 
that reduce non-commercial investment risks consistent with long-term develop-
ment targets; by encouraging energy prices that reflect real costs; and by maintain-
ing a stable political climate that reduces investment risks and broadens access to 
international capital markets. Nonetheless, the bottom line for energy investment 
remains unchanged - returns must, at least, match opportunity costs. 
Table 3 quantifies the cumulative energy sector capital requirements for 
Cases A, B and C, according to traditional definitions of energy investment. They 
include capital for energy production capacities, for conversion and transformation 
facilities, for transmission and distribution infrastructures, and for complying with 
environmental standards. They do not include investment in end-use technologies, 
such as furnaces, appliances and vehicles, because they are traditionally counted as 
durable consumer goods or business investment. However, the fact that the perfor-
mance of end-use technologies plays such an important role in all three cases in 
this study is a strong argument in favour of new approaches to evaluating energy 
sector investment. Integrated resource planning, for example, has begun to extend 
the traditional energy sector perspective to include investment in end-use technolo-
gies. Approaches that assess both supply options and end-use options, and both 
expansion and conservation, will be increasingly essential in all the futures repre-
sented by the three cases. 
A simple "back of the envelope" calculation can be used to illustrate the 
need to widen the definition of energy investment to the whole energy system, in-
cluding end-use. Case C relies heavily on measures to improve end-use efficiency. 
For the period 2020--50, table 3 shows cumulative investment in Case C to ,be only 
slightly more than half the investment in Case A. Compared with Case B, Case C 
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Table 3 
Cumulative investment in energy sector by region, 1990-2020 and 2020-50 
Case Aa CaseB Case cb 
1996--2020 2020-50 1996--2020 2020-50 1990-2020 2020-50 
Cumulative ($(1990) tr) 
OECD 8 IO 7 IO 5 4 
REFs 3 6 2 5 2 3 
DCs 9 18 7 15 6 11 
World 20 34 16 30 13 18 
As share of GDP (o/o) 
OECD 1.1 0.8 I. I 0.9 0.7 0.4 
REFs 9.0 4.3 7.9 5.9 7.0 3.9 
DCs 3.7 2.3 3.6 2.8 2.9 1.8 
World 1.9 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.1 
Per unit of primary energy($( 1990)/toe) 
OECD 50 49 51 60 46 42 
REFs 56 53 67 74 54 63 
DCs 44 49 40 51 42 48 
World 48 49 48 56 45 49 
a. Al scenario. 
b. Cl scenario. 
OECD = Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development. 
REFs = countries with reforming economies. 
DCs = developing countries. 
Figure 3 
Range of investment cost distributions as a histogram used to assess current 
and future financing requirements 
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has the same GWP, but the traditional energy investment is $400 bn less, or only 
64 per cent of the investment in Case B. This looks almost like a "free lunch." This 
picture may change drastically, if investment in end-use technologies is included. 
Case C uses four Gtoe less final energy, or six Gtoe less primary energy, than Case 
B (see table 2). Assume that this reduction is achieved with additional investment 
for more efficient end-use equipment and devices at levelised investment costs, 
comparable with average energy sector investment needs. For example, an average 
investment of $50/toe (see tables 2 and 3) would lead to total additional end-use 
capital requirements of $300 bn by the year 2020, for a reduction in primary en-
ergy needs of six Gtoe. This simple calculation suggests that the total investment in 
the energy system for Case C could be of the same magnitude as for Case B. How-
ever, should end-use investment turn out to be higher or lower than assumed in this 
overly simplistic calculation, the relative attributions could change radically. 
2.2 Investment requirements and technological change 
Future specific investment costs, especially for new energy technologies, can 
depend on the cumulative learning effects. The three cases incorporate future tech-
nological improvements in performance and capital cost reductions with increasing 
diffusion, especially of new technologies, such as photovoltaics, hydrogen produc-
tion or fuel cells. Capital costs of many conventional technologies also decline, al-
beit at a much slower rate, due to the inherently incremental improvement of 
mature technologies. 
The full report of the joint IIASA/WEC study devotes considerable space to 
the dynamics of technological progress and technological innovation and diffusion, 
drawing on the inventory of 1,400 technologies.9,10 We pooled all available esti-
mates of investment requirements from the inventory, so that the respective medi-
ans and ranges could be extracted from the data. For example, investment costs for 
solar systems and nuclear reactors were derived from 45 and 34 independent esti-
mates, respectively, as shown in figure 3. Near-term investment requirements as-
sumed for the three cases were derived from the medians of the empirical cost 
distributions. Lower ranges defined the scope for future cost reductions, along the 
learning curves that are realised at different rates in the three cases. 
The "learning" or "experience" curve characterises the pattern of diminish-
ing costs with increasing cumulative production. Its specific shape depends on the 
individual technology in question, but it is a persistent characteristic of all success-
ful, standardised technologies. Usually there are steep cost improvements during 
the research and development phase. For example, figure 4 shows an 18 per cent 
reduction in investment costs, per doubling of cumulative production of combus-
tion turbines. These are followed by more modest improvements, after commer-
cialisation - for combustion turbines, seven per cent per production doubling. 
Improvements continue for some time at a slower pace and then cease, as the tech-
nology approaches the end of its life-cycle.13 
Cases A, B and C incorporate technological change through learning · curve 
effects for various individual and generic technologies. These reflect different 
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Figure 4 
Technology learning curves; improvement in the costs per unit of capacity 
versus cumulative installed capacity 
R&D and technical Commercialization 
100 ~d_e_m_on_s_tr_at_io_n ~ph_a_se~o~~~~~~-ph_a~s_e _•~~~~ 1000 
10 100 1000 10000 100000 
Sources: adapted from MacGregor et a/11 and Christiansson.12 
priorities and varying impacts of related features , such as international trade in 
some technologies and the scope for local development and manufacture of others. 
In Case A, there is substantial advancement of all new, and currently mar-
ginal, energy production and conversion technologies. These advances are demon-
strated across the board: for hydrocarbon exploration and extraction; for nuclear 
electricity generation and hydrogen; and for renewable sources of electricity gener-
ation and biofuel production and conversion. In Case B, the advances are less sub-
stantial than in Case A, reflecting less concentrated research, development and 
diffusion efforts. In this respect, Case B lags behind Case A by 30 per cent. The 
bulk of the effort, in Case B, is put into the incremental improvement of existing 
technologies consistent with the case 's less concerted research and development ef-
forts . For Case C, learning curve effects by design favour low-carbon fossil and re-
newable technologies. These technologies benefit from improvements equal to 
those in Case A. All other technologies develop as in Case B. 
Technological change leads to capital cost reductions in all cases, with an in-
creasing scale of new technology deployment. This means that the future capital 
costs in the joint IIASA/WEC study might be smaller, due to technological change, 
compared with other studies that assume more static technological development. 
There are other reasons for a possible over-estimate of actual capital require-
ments. All cases explicitly adopt a cost-optimal structure of the energy system. 
Reality might be different, especially if the chronic lack of capital continues to 
trouble the developing world. Replacement of old vintages might be postponed, 
leading to lower capital requirements. However, if departures from the outlined 
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investment trajectories are too great, they may lead to energy supply shortages and, 
thus, to a loss of economic output, which would then be lower than assumed in the 
three cases. 
On the other hand, the possibility of under-estimation cannot be ruled out ei-
ther. For example, it is difficult to accurately account for the long-term ratio of 
peak-to-base load capacity, and the peak capacity may be higher than anticipated in 
the three cases. Also, if natural gas supplies cannot be brought to the market place 
at the rate indicated, the relatively low capital-intensive natural gas-fired electricity 
generation needs to be replaced by more capital-intensive coal or hydropower 
plants, and cumulative investment may tum out to be higher than calculated in the 
joint IIASA/WEC study. On the whole, capital requirements, implied by the three 
cases, can be considered to represent a realistic and a detailed account of the fi-
nancing needs of these three alternative futures. 
2.3 Energy investment in the three cases 
Looking frrst at cumulative capital requirements from 1990 to 2020, table 3 
shows the range across the cases to be from $13 to 20 tr. The developing region's 
share rises sharply, from today's 25-30 per cent to between 42 and 48 per cent, and 
it becomes the largest energy capital investment market in all cases. Looking at en-
ergy investment, as a share of regional GDP, the reforming countries rank the high-
est, diverting 7-9 per cent of regional GDP to the energy sector. They will be 
burdened by slow initial economic growth. At the same time, they will need to re-
place obsolete energy infrastructures, and it is likely to be extremely difficult to at-
tract the required capital to the energy sector. Developing countries invest 3-4 per 
cent of GDP in the energy sector, while OECD region investment is the lowest, at 
0.8-1.1 per cent of GDP. By and large, it takes a greater effort to build up an en-
ergy infrastructure than to expand and maintain an existing one. Finally, the bottom 
section of table 3 shows an upward trend for specific investment (dollars per unit 
of primary energy) in all cases, even though future energy investment does not in-
crease relative to GDP. 
To illustrate what goes into the cumulative capital requirements of table 3, 
figure 5 breaks down the different components for Case B. The figure shows that 
investment in electricity generation is dominated by the OECD, especially for the 
expansion of nuclear and coal-fired capacity. New renewable and hydropower in-
vestment is concentrated in developing regions. Given the current economic 
unattractiveness of most new renewables, this reflects substantial learning curve 
effects. Over $250 bn are invested in the development of a bio-fuel production in-
frastructure. The accepted view, that oil and gas generally are profitable investment 
opportunities, is reflected in both the volume and regional breakdown in the figure. 
From 2020 to 2050, capital requirements in table 3 grow substantially in ab-
solute terms, but still more slowly than GDP. This is true in all scenarios. It 
reflects, fust, the shift from supply-side investment (included in table 3) to ,end-use 
technology and infrastructure investment (not included in table 3). Had we been 
able to include the latter, we estimate it might have increased the numbers by 
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Figure S 
Breakdown of global cumulative energy sector investment for Case B, 
1990-2020 
trillion US(l 990 )$ 
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50-100 per cent. Secondly, the declining share of GDP going to energy investment 
reflects continued progress along technological learning curves, throughout the en-
ergy system. Had these been excluded, the capital requirements of the electricity 
sector in the OECD region would have been 8-15 per cent higher for 1990-2020. 
In developing regions, the impact would have been greater - an increase of 25-40 
per cent, due to heavy investment in new renewables and hydropower. Finally, and 
most importantly, capital requirements grow slower than GDP, because of the con-
tinuation of energy intensity improvements, characteristic for all three cases. 
2.4 Other estimates of financing requirements 
The figures in table 3 are consistent with the estimates of Energy for Tomor-
row's World. There, the estimated global capital requirement for 1990-2020 was 
$30 tr. This included efficiency improvement-related investment of approximately 
$7 tr, which is excluded here, but excluded learning curve effects in lowering fu-
ture investment, which are included here. Once both corrections are made, the fig-
ures are consistent. Energy for Tomorrow's World was also used as the basis for a 
simplified analysis by Hyman.8 Assuming an average capital cost of $750/k.W of 
generating capacity, he calculated the total 1990-2020 investment requirement to 
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be $4.3 tr for the electricity sector. For comparison, our detailed calculations esti-
mate requirements to be 75-125 per cent higher. 
Annual capital requirements for energy investment rise from a little less than 
$400 bn in 1990 to $500--750 bn by 2020 and $0.7-1.2 tr by 2050. A large share of 
this investment would probably have to be financed externally. Hyman estimates 
that a third of the global capital spending based on Energy for Tomorrow's World 
electricity needs would be externally financed. This implies that a large share of 
total energy investment would also need to come from international capital markets 
or development assistance. That compares with total funds transferred to develop-
ing countries in 1990 of about $140 bn, to a total debt service for these countries of 
about $150 bn, and to total official development assistance from the OECD coun-
tries of about $50 bn.14 
As its title suggests, the WEC report on Financing Energy Development: 
The Challenges and Requirements of Developing Countriesl5 investigated the 
challenges facing energy financing in the developing countries. The approach pur-
sued by that study complements the approach of this joint IIASA/WEC study in 
many respects. While the joint IIASA/WEC study made extensive use of for-
malised models, to assure consistency between economic development, energy ser-
vice demand, capacity build-up rates, resource development and extraction , 
grounded on detailed technology cost data, the WEC study on developing countries 
drew on the expertise of many individuals and institutions, including international 
development banks. The study focused more on the institutional and policy as-
pects, financing mechanisms, regulation, foreign investment, the role of interna-
tional development agencies, etc, and less on detailed calculations of energy 
investment requirements. The joint IIASA/WEC study accounted for investment 
needs on a technology-by-technology basis, separately, for production, conversion, 
transmission and distribution. The specific investment costs are dynamic and ac-
count for learning curve and economies of scale effeds. It should also be noted that 
the underlying energy development scenarios have not been harmonised between 
the two groups. Finally, the geographical and temporal scopes differ: the joint 
IIASA/WEC study includes the entire world, up to the year 2050, in greater detail, 
and to 2100, in outline, while the WEC study on developing countries considers 
the time period 1990--2020. 
One should note another fundamental difference, when comparing the sets of 
investment requirements produced by the two groups. The WEC study on develop-
ing countries excludes investment for energy exports in their estimates. The invest-
ment volumes reported are based on meeting developing countries' energy demand 
only. It is also unclear whether the volumes include investment for the replacement 
of retired plant and equipment. In addition, no capacity cushions are factored into 
the estimates for upstream oil and gas investment. 
The longer time-horizon of the joint IIASA/WEC study introduces a dis-
tinctly different investment profile than is found in the more static calculatiors of 
the WEC study on developing countries. Construction times for new power plants 
can be as long as a decade, or more. Therefore, the construction starts of capacity 
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Table 4 
Cumulative energy investment requirement in developing countries, 
reproduced from the WEC report,15 1990--2020 
$(1990) trillion 
Latin Sub-Saharan DCs 
Sector America MENAa Africa Pacific 
Electric power 1.10-1.80 0.30-0.50 0.20-0.40 0.53-1.12 
Oilb 0.07-0.24 0.06-0.16 0.04-0.13 0.03-0.13 
Natural gas 0.03-0.07 0.06-0.08 0.002-0.04 0.01-0.03 
Coal 0.01-0.03 QC 0.003-0.03 0.03-0.07 
Biomass and renewables 0.06-0.40 0.01-0.06 0.03--D.17 0.08-0.41 
Total 1.27-2.54 0.43-0.80 0.28-0.77 0.68-1.76 
a. MENA: Middle East and North Africa. 
b. Includes refining. 
c. No additional capacity required. 
South 
Asia All DCs 
0.30-0.60 2.43-4.42 
0.06-0.12 0.26-0.78 
0.01-0.03 0.11-0.25 
0.01-0.05 0.05-0.18 
0.05-0.19 0.23-1.23 
0.43-0.99 3.08-6.86 
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Table 5 
Cumulative energy investment requirement in developing countries, 
based on Cases Aa, Band Cb, 1990-2020 
Sector 
Electric power 
oue 
Natural gas 
Coal 
Biomass and renewables 
Total 
a. Al scenario. 
b. CJ scenario. 
c. MENA : Middle East and North Africa. 
Latin 
America 
0.31-0.38 
0.49-0.71 
0.27-0.32 
0.03-0.04 
0.03-0.06 
1.20-1.46 
$( 1990) trillion 
Sub-Saharan 
MENAC Africa 
0.16--0.22 0.16--0.21 
0.85-1.42 0.24-0.43 
0.50-0.60 0.03-0.04 
of 0.11-0.33 
0.007-0.01 0.03-0.08 
1.61-2.13 0.63-1.03 
d. Range for coal and biomass is too small at the level of significance. 
e. Includes refining. 
f. Investment is very low. 
DCs South 
Pacified Asia 
0.45-0.63 0.33-0.46 
0.11-0.24 0.02-0.04 
0.13-0.16 0.16--0.25 
0.04-0.04 0.10-0.12 
,0.03-0.03 0.01-0.03 
0.77-1.10 0.72-0.81 
Centrally 
Planned Asia All DCs 
0.74-1.15 2.15-3.03 
0.26--0.38 1.97-3.22 
0.12-0.17 1.25-1.49 
0.44-0.79 0.72-1.32 
0.07-0.18 0.25-0.30 
1.65-2.67 6.59-9.20 
Figure 6 
Cumulative energy sector capital requirement in developing countries 
for Case B, 1990-2020 
trillion US(l 990 )$ 
Hydro New Nuclear Oil Coal Gas Cogen TID 
ren. 
Electricity generation 
Gas Coal Oil Biomass 
Upstream 
additions, scheduled to connect to the grid in the early 2020s, will take place dur-
ing the 2010s. Consequently, the financing needs arise during that decade and are 
included in the 1990--2020 cumulative investment requirements. 
Table 4 summarises the energy investment requirements in the developing 
countries, for the period 1990--2020, reproduced from the WEC report. Table S 
summarises investment requirements from the joint IIASA/WEC study. The 
agreement between the two studies is surprisingly high, given the fundamentally 
different study approaches and underlying methodologies. The first notable dif-
ference (see tables 4 and 5 and figure 6) concerns the total investment volume. 
The lower range of the joint IIASA/WEC study of $6.6 tr barely overlaps with 
the upper range of the other estimate of $6.9 tr. The lower range estimates differ 
by a factor of two versus a factor of one and a half for the upper ranges. The sec-
toral breakdown reveals that the upstream investment in oil, natural gas and coal 
exceeds that of the WEC study on developing countries by an order of magni-
tude. Electric power development investment, however, agrees reasonably well 
between the two studies. Here, the estimates of the WEC study on developing 
countries are somewhat higher, which can be attributed to the· static specific in-
vestment costs used in the calculations. In addition, the share of hydropower in 
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electricity generation is generally 50 per cent higher than in the joint IIASA/ 
WEC study. The rapid hydropower capacity expansion implies the utilisation of 
fairly capital-intensive hydro resources. In contrast, the joint IIASA/WEC sce-
narios indicate an intensification of thermal power generation, based on natural 
gas. Natural gas turbines tend to be considerably less capital-intensive than hy-
dropower. In this context, it is important to note that, in the joint IIASA/WEC 
study, specific investment costs are different for domestically manufactured gen-
erating technologies and for technology imports. Conventional plant and equip-
ment are assumed to be largely of domestic origin and thus carry a lower price 
tag than the comparable equipment in the OECD; the costs of more complex 
plant are essentially uniform across the regions. 
The order of magnitude differences in the upstream sector investment vol-
umes arise from the large net fossil exports from the DCs primarily to the OECD, 
as well as the construction of an elaborate natural gas infrastructure. By the year 
2020, net exports range between 660 mtoe and 1,050 mtoe (the latter is approxi-
mately the 1990 volume), the bulk of which is Middle East oil exports. In addition, 
all developing regions accelerate oil and gas exploration over the coming 30 years, 
to meet growing domestic demand and to curb depletion of national income driven 
by oil imports. Several regions begin the development of capital-intensive, non-
conventional oil reserves after 2010. A considerable amount of capital is absorbed 
by the expansion of energy transmission and distribution infrastructures. 
2.5 Energy taxes and regulation 
The Case C scenarios deserve a special mention, because of the regulatory 
measures (e.g. taxes) they incorporate to accelerate energy intensity improvements 
and to limit carbon emissions; this does not mean that new energy taxes would not 
be needed in other cases, but, in Case C, they are imposed explicitly. This gradu-
ally increases the real cost of energy to consumers by approximately a factor of 
four between 1990 and 2050. Tax revenue from the OECD region is transferred to 
the developing countries, and revenue from developing countries is recycled inter-
nally. The transfer of resources to the South results in a reduction in economic 
growth in the North. However, the potential impact of energy taxes is much larger 
in the South. First, the capital infusion from the North is not enough to offset the 
higher real cost of energy. Secondly, the impact depends on how productively tax 
revenue can be used. Taken together, these effects cause the 1990-2020 economic 
growth rates in Case C to fall behind those in Case A. However, in the longer run 
(post 2050), the transfer of funds to the South leads to GDP growth rates in Case C 
that exceed those in Case A. In the end, Case C's GDP in the South approaches 
that of Case A, and, in any case, is substantially higher than in the non-cooperative 
Case B. This hypothetical case illustrates that capital transfers from energy tax rev-
enue could, in principle, be used for easing capital shortages in the developing 
countries, but that it requires an unprecedented degree of international cooperation. 
The relationship between energy regulatory and tax policies and investment is an 
important issue for the future assessment of energy financing requirements. 
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3. Conclusions 
For all scenarios, the capital requirements of the energy sector are extremely 
large, but not infeasible. The good news is that investment requirements are likely 
to expand at a slower pace than overall economic growth. But there are two pieces 
of bad news. First, the energy sector will have to raise an increasing fraction of its 
capital from the private sector, where it will face stiffer competition and return on 
investment criteria than it has in the past. Secondly, most of the investment that 
needs to be made is in the developing countries, where current trends in the avail-
ability of both international development capital and private investment capital are 
not auspicious. The longer-term prospects of overall economic growth outpacing 
energy capital requirements are no reason for complacency. The most difficult in-
vestment challenge is usually the next power plant, pipeline or refinery. Unlike en-
ergy resource requirements, where uncertainty and potential difficulties are of a 
longer-term nature, capital requirements and finance need to be addressed and 
dealt with now. Today's investment will shape the immediate future, as well as the 
long-term options. 
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APPENDIX 
Short description of the three cases 
Case A (High Growth) is characterised by enormous productivity increases 
and wealth. It is technology- and resource-intensive and presumes favourable 
geopolitics and free markets. High growth facilitates a more rapid turnover of capi-
tal stock and changes in economic structure, both of which spur efficiency im-
provements and technological progress. If Case A is extended all the way to 2100, 
global average per capita income surpasses even the highest levels observed today 
and current distinctions between "developed" and "developing" regions become 
obsolete. Case A includes three scenarios, addressing alternative key developments 
in energy supply. In the Al scenario, there is ample future availability of oil and gas 
resources. At the other end of the spectrum, the A2 scenario assumes oil and gas 
resources are more limited, resulting in a massive return to coal. Finally, in the A3 
scenario, rapid technological change in nuclear and renewable energy technologies 
results in a phase-out of fossil fuels, for economic reasons rather than due to re-
source scarcity. This unfolding into three different development trajectories results 
in three scenarios with almost identical energy end-use patterns but different en-
ergy system structures. 
Case B (Middle Course), with a single scenario, is based on a more cautious 
approach, regarding economic growth prospects, rates of technological change and 
energy availability. In short, the scenario is, perhaps, best characterised by "modest 
dynamics" and derives its appeal primarily because it is "pragmatic." Overall, the 
Case B scenario is "reachable", without relying on drastic changes in current insti-
tutions, technologies or current perceptions of the availability of fossil fuel re-
sources. The more modest energy use , compared with Case A, implies that 
scenario B can rely on fossil fuel resources to an extent that is commensurate with 
current estimates of ultimately recoverable oil and gas reserves. Energy supply and 
end-use patterns are also closer to the current situation for a longer period in Case 
B than in Cases A and C. Beyond 2020, however, the depletion of fossil resources, 
without counterbalancing technological progress, will force more dramatic changes 
in energy supply structures. Nonetheless, a transition away from fossil fuel use is 
feasible and manageable. In the very long term, the changes become much more 
dramatic, and an orderly transition away from fossil fuel use is not only feasible 
but appears to be manageable, in terms of energy sector and institutional adjust-
ments extending towards the end of the 21st century. 
Case C (Ecologically Driven) presents challenging global perspectives. It is 
optimistic about technology and geopolitics, but it also assumes unprecedented and 
aggressive international cooperation focused explicitly qn environmental protec-
tion. It builds on substantial resource transfers from North to South, spurring 
growth in the South that will lead to a significant reduction in present economic 
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disparities. In addition to stringent control of local and regional pollutants, a global 
regime, to control the emissions of greenhouse gases, is established. The goal is to 
reduce C02 emission levels to two GtC by the year 2100 [corresponding to one-
third of 1990 levels required to stabilise atmospheric concentrations 16]. Ambitious 
policy measures accelerate energy efficiency improvements and develop and pro-
mote environmentally benign, decentralised energy technologies. One policy op-
tion considered for achieving this goal is a carbon tax that gradually increases to 
$400 per tC in the year 2100. Case C describes a transition away from the current 
dominance of fossil fuels towards a dominance of renewable energy flows. The 
quality of the energy carriers delivered to end-users is high, in order to meet the 
environmental constraints, so that renewable energy sources are transformed into 
electricity, liquid and gaseous energy carriers. Nuclear energy is at a crossroads 
and this constitutes the main difference between the two Case C scenarios. 
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